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This paper theoretically analyzes fake reviews on a platform market using mod-
els where a seller creates fake reviews through incentivized transactions, and its sales
depend on its rating based on a review history. The platform can control the incen-
tive for fake reviews by changing the parameters of the rating system, such as weights
placed on old and new reviews and its filtering policy. At equilibrium, the number of
fake reviews increases as quality increases but decreases as reputation improves. Since
fake reviews have a positive relationship with a product’s underlying quality, rational
consumers find a rating more informative when fake reviews exist, while credulous con-
sumers suffer from a bias caused by boosted reputation. A stringent filtering policy can
decrease the expected amount of fake reviews and the bias of credulous consumers, but
at the same time, it can decrease the informativeness of a rating system for rational
consumers. In terms of the weight placed on the review history, rational consumers
benefit from higher weights on past reviews than from optimal weights without fake
reviews.
[The latest version is available here.]
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Figure 1: An example of a refund offer
FakeOffer2.png
Person Red, who is suspected as a seller on Amazon, posts pictures of its products and offers
full refunds of the products after reviews of them. About an hour after of the post, Person
Blue, who is suspected as a fake reviewer, shows an interest on the products and refunds.
1 Introduction
Online platform markets are growing worldwide, such that both businesses and their cus-
tomers increasingly rely on reviews on the platforms.1 At the same time, incentives for
sellers to make fake reviews are also growing. Washington Post (Dwoskin and Timberg,
2018) reports that based on fake review detection algorithms, 50.7% of reviews for Blue-
tooth headphones, 58.2% for Bluetooth speakers, 55.6% for weight loss pills, and 67.0% for
testosterone boosters on Amazon are suspicious. How do sellers make fake reviews? The
sellers can post information of their products with refund offers, which are typically finalized
via PayPal after purchases and positive reviews on Amazon. (See Fig. 1 for an example of
such an offer.)2 These reviews correspond to verified purchases and are reflected to the star
rating (until they are detected by Amazon).3 He et al. (2020) connect such refund offers on
Facebook with product listings on Amazon and show a positive correlation between refund
offers on Facebook and a product’s performance on Amazon such as its ratings, sales ranking,
and the number of reviews. Regulators have been concerned about fake reviews, and their
attitude toward fake reviews is becoming stringent. For instance, in 2019, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) filed the first case against paid fake reviews by CureEncapsulations on
Amazon. Online platforms have restricted fake reviews in their own ways, but regulators put
1Hollenbeck (2018); Hollenbeck et al. (2019) show that ratings work as a substitute of other form of
advertisement or brand names, and this pattern is getting stronger over time in the hotel industry. Reimers
and Waldfogel (2020) exhibit that the existence of star ratings has 15 times as the impact on consumer
surplus as the professional reviews on New York Times. For the institutional details and data analysis on
platforms and ratings, see also Belleflamme and Peitz (2018)
2For more details on evasive practice by incentivized reviewers and agents who contact buyers to incen-
tivize them to write reviews, see Oak (2021).
3Offers of such fake reviews from fake reviewers have been found on eBay.
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increasingly high pressure on online platforms to maintain a stricter attitude against fake
reviews. 4
However, the impact of fake reviews on consumers on a platform is not clear. First,
consumers might not be fooled by fake reviews if they know that there are fake reviews. In
the standard work of Holmström (1999), the market can correctly anticipate the behavior
of long-lived players and debias the signal. Furthermore, customers might be able to elicit
additional information from fake reviews. If only high-quality sellers make fake reviews to
boost their initial reputation, the boosted rating can be an even better signal of good quality.
Such a behavior might be possible if low quality is revealed via word of mouth, and only a
high-quality seller can reap benefits from future sales, as suggested by Nelson (1970,1974) in
the context of advertising. 5
In this study, we examine a theoretical model in which sales are determined by the seller’s
reputation level and the seller chooses the amount of positive fake reviews at each instance.
Consumers perceive a seller’s reputation based on the potentially boosted ratings displayed
on the platform. The platform can control how strictly it filters fake reviews and how much
the rating reflects the information of past feedback (i.e., how fast the rating evolves). A
key assumption in this study is that it becomes harder for a seller to make fake reviews
as its reputation improves because of the higher reimbursement necessary to incentivize
reviewers due to the higher price.6 This brings more fake reviews from the seller with low
reputation. This also generates the dependence of fake reviews on the seller’s quality-type.
Because high-quality sellers benefit more from their high reputation, high-quality sellers
generate more fake reviews at equilibrium. Because of this positive relationship between the
number of fake reviews and quality, consumers sometimes benefit from lenient policies on
fake reviews. In the literature on signaling promotion, the complementarity between quality
and reputation is understudied because, in most research, promotion is done only once at the
beginning of a game. In this study, the complementarity comes from the future cost-saving
effect rather than an increase in revenue.
4For instance, in 2019, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in U.K. launched work programme
“has written to Facebook and eBay this week urging them to conduct an urgent review of their sites to prevent
fake and misleading online reviews from being bought and sold”. In responses, both Facebook and eBay have
immediately deleted posts identified by CMA, and updated their policy to explicitly prohibit offers of fake
reviews. In 2020, May, CMA has launched new investigation into online websites on how they currently
detect fake or misleading reviews.
5Ananthakrishnan et al. (2020) analyze the display of fake reviews from a different perspective and show
that the consumers form more trust on the platform if it shows the fake reviews with flags indicating them
as fake reviews, rather than deleting them from the platform.
6We can see the interaction between fake reviews and reputation more commonly. For instance, fake
reviews might be crowded out if the seller receives many organic feedback due to large demand caused by
high reputation. Then, the effective fake review would be costly for such a seller.
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The opposite dependence of fake reviews on a reputation about quality and on the under-
lying true quality also provides some cautions on empirical analysis on signaling promotion.
That is, reputation-based indices, such as customer rating, can be a bad proxy for a product’s
underlying quality. Researchers can estimate opposite results if they use customer rating as
a proxy for quality. Furthermore, even if the true quality is measured, it is important to
control for the reputation level when estimating the relationship between promotion and the
underlying quality. Fig. 2 exemplifies the possibility of an omitted variable issue; that is,
the promotion level and the true quality of a product can be negatively correlated without
being conditioned upon a firm’s reputation level, even though quality and promotion have a
positive relationship, ceteris paribus.
The negative relationship between fake reviews and a firm’s reputation also increases the
speed at which the rating changes. That is, in the presence of fake reviews, when the rating
goes down (up), it more quickly goes up (down) than when the rating system has no fake
reviews. This distorts the informativeness of the rating system. How fast the rating changes
relates to the relative weight of new information in the rating system. The greater is the
weight of new information (and the lower the weight of old information), the faster is the
transition of the rating. Thus, the equilibrium effect that makes the transition faster has the
effect of distorting upward the weight of the new information (and downward the weight of
the old information). Therefore, given the existence of fake reviews, the platform needs to
make some adjustments. The platform should set a lower weight for new information (and
higher weight for old information) compared with a rating system that has no fake reviews.
The discussion above is based on the assumption of rational consumers who know the
seller’s strategy. However, the regulator’s concern is not necessarily on sophisticated con-
sumers but more on naive consumers, who are vulnerable to fake reviews.7 In this study,
we also incorporate such consumers and show how much they become biased as a result of
fake reviews by the sellers. Even though in general the relationship between the bias and
the censorship policy is not monotonous, stringent censorship generally reduces the naive
consumer’s bias under a reasonable range of parameters.
Thus, the regulator might face a trade-off between the precision of the information for
rational consumers and the bias that credulous consumers suffer from. This study provides
a framework for analyzing such a trade-off.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related
literature. In Section 3, we analyze a model with rational buyers. In Section 4, we introduce
7For instance, Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s mission is “[p]rotecting consumers and com-
petition by preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through ...”.
(https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc)
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credulous consumers. Section 5 concludes. Most of the proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
This paper mainly contributes to two streams of literature: rating design and signaling
through promotion. The literature on rating design can be divided into two strands: (i)
how to reveal the known quality level or estimated quality index (i.e., whether to reveal full
information or add noise/coarsen the information) and (ii) how to generate the index of an
unknown quality based on the multiple sources of information on a player’s performance.
The first strand is often framed in the context of certification, such as the works of
Lizzeri (1999), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2009), Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015), Harbaugh and
Rasmusen (2018), Hopenhayn and Saeedi (2019), Hui et al. (2018). Some models are made
tractable by the representation with posterior distribution in the line of Bayesian persuasion
proliferated by Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Saeedi and
Shourideh (2020) extend the framework wherein the quality is endogenously chosen by the
seller rather than the exogenous variable.
This paper relates to another strand of literature, as it analyzes how to aggregate the
players’ actions into a single index. In a one-shot model, Ball (2019) analyzes the optimal
way to aggregate the various sources of potentially manipulated signals. In a dynamic setting
based on Holmström’s (1999) signal jamming/career concern model, Hörner and Lambert
(2018) show that the effort level of a long-lived player is maximized by a rating that is linear
to past observations. Vellodi (2020) analyzes the impact of rating on the entry/exit behavior
of a firm and derives an optimal rating that prevents high-quality sellers from exiting from
the market due to a reputation trap of failing to accumulate good reputation because of
initial bad luck. Bonatti and Cisternas (2019) examine a long-lived consumer’s Ratchet
effect. The consumers try to hide its willingness to pay to avoid the personalized pricing by
short-lived monopolist, so that the consumption does not perfectly reflect their willingness to
pay. Similarly to Hörner and Lambert (2018) and Bonatti and Cisternas (2019), this study
examines the relationship between a signal-jamming structure and a linear rating system. In
contrast to Hörner and Lambert (2018), the equilibrium strategy is dependent on the hidden
quality and reputation, such that the seller’s strategy changes the informativeness of the
rating on the equilibrium path, as in Bonatti and Cisternas (2019).8 In contrast to Bonatti
8Another contrast to Hörner and Lambert (2018) is that they start from a general information structure
so that they can represent any reputation by changing the information structure. Then, they can focus on
the resulted process of reputation level in a similar way that researchers focus on the resulted outcome by
the revelation principle in the context of the mechanism design. On the other hand, this paper and Bonatti
and Cisternas (2019) use more specific information structure, so that we should examine how the consumers
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and Cisternas (2019), where the effect of the manipulation is endogenously determined via
the short-lived player’s belief, in this study, the platform controls for the effectiveness of
the manipulation so that we can analyze the impact of censorship by the platform. In
addition, this study departs from the literature by analyzing the impact of manipulation on
naive/credulous consumers, which is often the concern of regulators.
This paper also contributes to the literature on promotion and signaling. Nelson (1970,
1974) argues that even if the promotion does not have any intrinsic information, “burn-
ing money” itself can be a signal of good quality because such a signal pays off only for
high-quality firms through repeated purchases in the future. This idea is formalized later by
Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986a) and many others as separating
equilibria in signaling models. Using a one-shot signal-jamming framework instead of a sig-
naling model, Mayzlin (2006) shows a negative relationship between promotion through fake
reviews and quality, and Dellarocas (2006) generalizes conditions for the positive/negative
correlation in a one-shot signal-jamming model. Bar-isaac and Deb (2014) examine the ef-
fects of vertically/horizontally heterogeneous preferences, and Grunewald and Kräkel (2017)
examine the effect of competition between firms. Most studies on the signaling role of pro-
motion are based on models with one-shot promotion, except for Horstmann and MacDonald
(1994), where the experience of the product is an imperfect signal of the quality, and the
signaling via advertising is done only after establishing a reputation so that it is hard for
low-quality sellers to mimic high-quality sellers’ behavior.9. In this study, I examine a dy-
namic signal-jamming model, where reputational concern is the driving force for the positive
correlation between quality and promotion. It also generates non-degenerate dynamics con-
sistent with an observation by Luca and Zervas (2016) that strategic manipulation increases
after a drop in reputation.
The dependence of fake reviews on reputation also provides some implications for the
empirical literature on signaling promotion. The literature has had weak support regarding
the correlation between quality and promotion. For instance, Kwoka (1984) observes that op-
tometrists with more advertisements provide less thorough eye examination, and Horstmann
and Moorthy (2003) observe that advertising is hump-shaped in terms of quality among
restaurants in New York. Recently, Sahni and Nair (2019) implement a quasi-experiment
to isolate the intrinsic information and signaling effect of burning money and show that the
consumer positively responds to the burning of money. They point out that it is difficult to
interpret the resulted rating.
9Aside from the context of the rating system or the signaling promotion, Grugov and Troya-Martinez
(2019) examine the biasing behavior of the seller in a model a. la. Holmström (1999) incorporating a
detection rule and credulous consumers, and show that the biasing behavior increases as the authority
requires stricter rule and the share of credulous consumer increases.
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Figure 2: A simulated distribution of quality levels and the amount of fake reviews
The left panel show that the the amount of the fake reviews is negatively correlated with the
quality level, unconditional on the level of reputation. On the other hand, the right panel
shows that the amount of the fake reviews is increasing in the quality level, conditional on
the reputation level.
show the relationship between quality and promotion level because it is difficult to obtain
a reliable measure of quality. This paper emphasizes this point. A reputation-based index,
such as customer rating, can be a bad proxy for the underlying quality. The reputation
level and the underlying quality level have opposite impacts on the promotion level in equi-
librium. Furthermore, even if the true quality is measured, it is important to control for
the reputation level. As shown in Fig. 2 , the level of promotion and the true quality can
be negatively correlated without being conditioned upon the reputation level, even though
quality and promotion have a positive relationship, ceteris paribus.
3 Rating Design for Rational Consumers
In this study, we examine both models with rational consumers and naive consumers. In
this section, we first introduce a baseline model with a mass of rational consumers. The
consumers rationally expect that a long-lived seller makes fake reviews following a linear
strategy. However, they cannot induce the seller’s exact action at time t because the quality is
still hidden, even though the strategy and the current reputation are known to the consumers.
Then, in the next section, we introduce a market with naive consumers who do not
expect any fake reviews while the seller makes fake reviews, such that the reputation is
biased upward. In each model, we examine the impact of the platform’s filtering/censoring
policy on reviews, the weights of new and old reviews, and the precision of genuine reviews.
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3.1 Model
The model is in a continuous time and infinite horizon, t ∈ [0, ∞). At each instance t, a
long-lived seller sells q units of its product, whose quality is denoted as θt, and makes Ft units
of fake reviews. A sufficiently large mass, n, of consumers forms a demand function such that
the price pt = E [θt|Yt] ≡ Mt clears the market, where Yt is the rating of the product at time
t.10 The price being a representation of the reputation of the hidden quality is the standard
assumption in the literature on reputation. The quality θt governs consumers’ willingness to
pay for the product, so the price is high when the expected quality of the product is high.
A more specific underlying model, that can incorporate naive consumers is suggested in the
Appendix.
The quality, θt, and rating, Yt, change over time. The quality, θt, follows an exogenous
mean-reverting process:
dθt = κ (−θt + µ) dt+ σθdZθt (1)
while the rating, Yt, is characterized by the following differential equation:
dYt = −φYt + dξt (2)
where dξt is defined as:











is a standard Brownian motion; a is the effectiveness of the fake review; b
is the feedback rate from customers; µ is the mean of θt in the stationary distribution, and
σθ and σξ govern the standard deviations of the disturbance. The exogenous mean-reverting
process of θt is understood as resulting from the competition over quality among sellers.
The relative quality of a firm’s product might decrease due to the rise of other sellers with
even higher quality. The firm’s product’s relative quality might increase when a competitor
increases its product’s price. The transition of the rating, Yt, is interpreted in a discrete time
analogue that the future rating, Yt+dt, is a weighted sum of the new reviews, dξt, and the
previous reviews, Yt, with weights of 1 and 1 − φdt, respectively. After filtering suspicious
reviews, the new reviews consist of two components: “organic” reviews and the remaining
fake reviews. The second and third terms of Eq. (3) correspond to organic reviews. Higher
quality tends to generate high reviews, and the information becomes precise when there is
feedback from many transactions (i.e., high q) or a high response rate (i.e., high b). The
disturbance, σξdZ
ξ
t , is caused by the heterogeneity of the criteria among customers.
11 The
10Saeedi (2019) showed that the reputation is the measure determinant of the price on eBay market.
11In this paper, the mechanism behind the customer feedback is abstracted and assumed that the fixed
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first term is the effect of the fake reviews. The seller tries to boost the average review through
fake reviews, but some of them are detected by the platform, and the remaining reviews enter
as aFtdt. Thus, a small a implies stringent censorship. As in Hörner and Lambert (2018),
Vellodi (2020), and Bonatti and Cisternas (2019), the rating, Yt, does not exactly capture
5-star rating on Amazon, Yelp, or some other online platform. The level of Yt is dependent
on the mean of θt and other parameters. By this specification of the rating, we can rely on
the normality to simplify the analysis.
The seller’s instantaneous payoff is defined as:




where τ denotes the transaction fees imposed by the platform. The first term is the total
revenue from all transactions, including those corresponding to fake reviews, and the second
term is the reimbursement cost to the fake reviewers. The last term expresses that generating
more fake reviews is harder. The seller might find it challenging to search for incentivized
reviewers through communities such as Facebook. Some fake review services may charge a
higher price for fake reviews. Furthermore, increasing the number of fake reviews come with
a higher risk of being detected by the platform. The cost of production is abstracted out
from the model. 12 The long-lived seller maximizes its discounted present value by choosing
(Ft)t≥0.
The instantaneous profit becomes easier to compare with the previous research when it
is rewritten as follows:
πt = (1− τ)Mt · q − τMt · Ft −
c
2
F 2t . (4)
Without the second term in eq. (4), the model becomes effectively a special case of Hörner
and Lambert (2018), which is based on Holmström’s (1999) signal-jamming model and uses
a general information structure as a rating. However, due to the existence of this term,
the marginal cost of the manipulation depends on the current reputation level. Therefore,
the equilibrium manipulation level depends on the current rating in contrast to Hörner and
Lambert (2018), where the equilibrium action turns out to be state-independent. Instead
of relying on the time- and state-invariant action, we apply the idea of Bonatti and Cister-
portion of consumers keep reviewing. For detailed analysis on the customer feedback, see Chevalier et al.
(2018) and the literature cited in it. They analyze the relationship with managerial responses to reviews.
12Whether the high quality seller or low quality seller face high costs of production is arguable by itself.
If high quality come from the seller’s high productivity, the high quality seller can produce with lower costs.
If the low quality is by the seller’s choice rather than the difference in the production technology among
sellers, the low quality product would be associated with low production cost. The different specifications
on the production costs can cause different pattern in fake reviews, but those extensions are deferred to the
future research.
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nas (2019) to focus on a linear strategy, and a Gaussian stationary distribution of (θt, Yt).
Then, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation gives a simple quadratic value function, which
is solved by the guess-and-verify method. It is verified that as τ approaches zero, the equi-
librium strategy becomes invariant to θt, Yt, (and t).
The interaction between the current reputation and the current action is considered as
the driving force of the non-degenerate Markov equilibrium strategy. In this study, this
interaction between reputation and manipulation is derived from the reimbursement to fake
reviewers; however, such an interaction can be more commonly observed in the context of
fake reviews. For instance, if the reputation is high, then a large demand can crowd-out fake
reviews, such that the effective fake reviews can be more costly given the high reputation.
In the Appendix, an alternative model with such an interpretation is discussed. A model
with a changing quantity that is isomorphic to the main model is discussed in Appendix C.
Definition of the Equilibrium As mentioned above, we focus on a linear Markov strategy
equilibria, where a linear Markov strategy maximizes the seller’s discounted present value
among any admissible strategies.
A linear strategy (in θt and Yt) is defined as:
Ft = α̂θt + β̂Yt + γ̂
Note that θt does not directly appear in the instantaneous payoff function, but it appears in
the transition of the payoff relevant state variable, Yt. Thus, the seller is potentially sensitive
to the level of θt. Now the equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A linear Markov strategy F = (Ft)t≥0 s.t. Ft = α̂θt + β̂Yt + γ̂ is a stationary
Gaussian linear Markov equilibrium if













2. Mt = E [θt|Yt], and
3. (θt, Yt)t≥0 induced by F is a stationary Gaussian.
We do not know that (θt, Yt)t≥0 is stationary or Gaussian ex ante because Yt is endoge-
nously determined by Ft. However, given a linear strategy, the condition for (θt, Yt)t≥0 to
be a stationary Gaussian is simply characterized by an inequality—similar to Bonatti and
Cisternas (2019)—by Eqs. (2) and (3), and the definition of the linear strategy,
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Thus, an inequality, φ − aβ̂ > 0, must hold for (θt, Yt)t≥0 to have a stationary distribution
(otherwise, the process of Yt diverges). When (θt, Yt) is a stationary Gaussian, by the
projection theorem on the Gaussian distribution,
Mt ≡ E [θt|Yt] = E [θt] +
Cov (θt, Yt)
V ar (Yt)
[Yt − E [Yt]] (6)
Furthermore, if it is stationary, all expectations in Eq.(6) are constants. By letting λ ≡
Cov(θt, Yt)
V ar(Yt)
and ν ≡ E [Yt] (and µ = E [θt] by construction), Eq.(6) is written as Mt = µ +
λ[Yt − ν]. In the following part of this section, we use Mt instead of Yt as a state variable
for the sake of expositional simplicity. Then, the linear strategy is redefined as
Ft = αθt + βMt + δµ
The stationary condition is summarized as follows:
Lemma 1. (Stationarity and the characterization of the long-run moments) Suppose Ft =
αθt+βMt+ δµ where Mt ≡ E [θt|Yt] for all t ≥ 0. Then, a process (θt, Yt)t≥0 is a stationary
Gaussian if and only if
i. Mt = µ+ λ [Yt − ν] for all t













where Γ is the variance-
covariance matrix in the stationary distribution.
The third condition is required so that the game starts from a stationary distribution.
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Now, the HJB equation is simply written by using Ito’s lemma:
rV (θ, M) = sup
F∈R
(1− τ)M · q − τM · F − c
2
F 2
− κ (θ − µ)Vθ
+
{
aλF + bqλθ − φ
[











By guessing the quadratic form of the value function, V = v0+v1θ+v2M+v3θ
2+v4M
2+v5θM ,
and the linear strategy, we can verify the existence and uniqueness of the value function and
the linear strategy via the matching coefficient.
3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
The equilibrium strategy is characterized by guessing the quadratic value function and the
linear strategy and by matching coefficients α, β, δ, (vk)
5
k=0 of the first-order conditions, en-
velop conditions, and the stationarity condition characterized in Lemma 1. In the proof, the
characterizing conditions are summarized into one equation h (L) = 0 with an aggregator
L ≡ aλβ, and then all the equilibrium coefficients are derived as a function of L. Aggre-
gator L is interpreted as an equilibrium effect on the speed of the rating transition or the
equilibrium effect on the relative weight of new information. When L is positive, the rating
transition effectively speeds up because the low rating is soon boosted back to the average
rating by fake reviews.
By analyzing the existence and uniqueness of the aggregator L and examining the corre-
sponding equilibrium coefficients, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Existence and uniqueness). There is always a stationary linear Markov equi-






, λ > 0 and L > 0 hold. Furthermore, if
h′ (L) < 0 holds, then such an equilibrium is unique, and the equilibrium coefficients α, β,
and δ are differentiable in the parameters.
h′ (L) < 0 holds for any L > 0 if 6κφ+ 4r2 + 2κr + 17rφ+ 19φ2 > κ2.
Note that 6κφ+ 4r2 + 2κr + 17rφ+ 19φ2 > κ2 is a loose and reasonable condition. φ is
the transition speed of the rating, and κ is the transition speed of the quality. The required
inequality is reasonable as long as the rating system is meant to help estimate the current
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quality. For instance, even if the true quality does not drift much (i.e., κ ≃ 0), the rating
should drift toward the underlying true quality (i.e., φ > 0).
Intuition of the Equilibrium Strategy In Theorem 1, it is shown that high-quality
types make more fake reviews (α > 0), conditional on its reputation level. and high-
reputation type makes fewer fake reviews (β < 0) conditional on the quality type. Given the
logic of Nelson (1970; 1074), α > 0 (and β < 0) might look intuitive, but this model adds
different reasons than the previous research.





M + aλ {v2 + 2Mtv4 + θv5}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=VM




v4. Furthermore, the envelope condition gives an expression for v4 so






. The first term comes from the interaction of
the reputation level and the fake reviews in the cost term, τMtFt. If the reputation is high,
then the marginal cost of the fake review is high. Therefore, the seller will make fewer fake
reviews given a higher reputation. The second term corresponds to the fake review’s marginal
benefit in the future. Given the equilibrium strategy, v4 = − βτ2(−aβλ+r+2φ) is positive, meaning
that the marginal benefit in the future increases with the reputation. This is because the
future self will reduce the amount of fake reviews after observing the boosted reputation
due to today’s fake reviews. Furthermore, this effect increases with Mt because the future
reputation Mt+dt tends to be high given a high Mt, so the interaction term
τMt+dtFt+dt = ατMt+dtθt+dt + τβM
2
t+dt + δµτMt+dt (8)
decreases quadratically given a negative β. It turns out that the first term dominates the
second term; thus β remains negative.
The intuition of positive α comes from the complementarity between the quality, θ, and
the reputation, M , in the seller’s value function. With high quality θt today, the reputation
in the future tends to be higher than the case with low quality today, given the same
level of reputation Mt today. Furthermore, as previously stated, the future benefit from
the reputation boost is higher given a higher reputation in the future. Thus, high quality
results in a high incentive for fake reviews. Mathematically, the equilibrium coefficient α is
characterized as
α = aλv5 =
aλ
κ+ r + φ
{2 (aα + bq)λv4 − ατ} (9)
The first equality reveals that the sign of α comes from the complementarity of θ and M in
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the value function. In the last expression, (aα + bq)λ indicate that the high θt results in a
high Mt+dt. It is multiplied with positive v4, which represents an increasing marginal value
with respect to Mt+dt. This is the driving force of the positive α. The remaining term of Eq.
(9), −ατ , states that such an incentive is attenuated because the quality in the near future
θt+dt tends to be high given high θt; thus, today’s fake reviews increase the cost in the future
via the first term of Eq. (8).
In summary, the driving force of β < 0 is the incentive to reduce τMtFt today given a
high Mt. α is positive because of the complementarity of θt and Mt through cost savings.
Readers might wonder why an increase in revenue (like Nelson, 1970, 1974) does not appear
in the above argument. If θt is high, the boosted revenue would stay high for a long time; but
in this model, such a product would eventually achieve a high reputation through organic
feedback even without fake reviews. Therefore, the marginal future revenue dps
dFt
(s ≥ t) is
independent of θt. It is worth noting that the same intuition applies even in a variant of the
model with a fixed price p and time-varying quantity qt discussed in the Appendix.
3.2.1 Properties of the equilibrium
Before examining the normative properties of the equilibrium, we check some positive prop-
erties of the equilibrium.
First, the expected amount of fake reviews is increasing in a. This is simply because
the marginal benefit of fake reviews in the future would increase if the platform loosens
the censorship policy. The model does not guarantee a positive amount of fake reviews in
general, but it is also shown that the expected amount of fake reviews is positive under some
parameters.
Proposition 1. E [Ft] increases with L and L increases with a. Furthermore, E [Ft] ≥ 0
holds for sufficiently large a.
Thus, the model can represent a reasonable situation under some parameters where fake
reviews have non-trivial effect (i.e., a is significantly high). There still remains a small
probability that Ft becomes negative due to the normal distribution, but the model can
approximate a reasonable distribution of the fake reviews, under which the negative revenue
is rarely observed, as shown in Fig. 2.
The precision of “organic” feedback from normal customers also monotonically changes
the expected amount of fake reviews. When the organic feedback from customers varies a lot,
it is hard for the seller to manipulate the reputation because a boosted rating is attributed
to a large variation in the feedback.







Even though a stringent policy decreases the expected amount of fake reviews, as shown
in Proposition 1, it does not imply that the seller’s strategy gets closer to the no-fake strategy
of {α, β, δ} = {0, , 0, 0}. Moreover, the stringent policy might have unintentional effects of
increasing the absolute value of the equilibrium coefficients.










Under a stringent policy (small a), the marginal benefit of fake review decreases because
fake reviews are reflected less in the rating; but at the same time, the dependence of the
marginal benefit on the current reputation also decreases. Mathematically, the second term






decreases while the marginal cost still depends on the current
reputation regardless of the censoring policy. Therefore, |β| increases owing to the less
countervailing effect.
In the proof of the proposition, the intensity of dynamic consideration is also captured
by an aggregator L = −aλβ, which is the equilibrium effect on the reputation transition
speed. L becomes smaller when the dynamic incentive becomes smaller; thus, α, which
only comes from the future marginal benefit, becomes smaller, and |β|, to which the future
marginal benefit only works as a counteracting effect, becomes greater because the present











. Furthermore, L → 0
as aτ
c
→ 0 and L → ∞ as aτ
c
→ ∞.
This concludes Proposition 3. α does not necessarily increase in a because α is a function
in a and L, so the change in a affects directly and indirectly via L, and the net impact is
not clear. |β| does not necessarily decrease in τ
c
for an analogous reason even though a limit
of τ → 0 is known.
Proposition 3 implies less signaling (smaller α) and more distortion in the effective tran-
sition speed of the rating (greater |β|) when the aggregator on the strategic effect L is small.
This suggests less information from the rating system when the strategic effect L is small.
In the following section, we formally examine this effect.
Some limits of the equilibrium strategy are worth noting before jumping into a normative
analysis. Since the negative β comes from the interaction term in the cost of the fake reviews,
whose coefficient is τ , β approaches zero as τ approaches zero. At the same time, α also
approaches zero because the complementarity of θ and M is caused by future cost savings
via negative β. In this limit, the fake reviews become constant as in Holmström (1999). This
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. |α|, |β| → 0 as τ → 0.
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3.3 Optimal Rating System for Rational Consumers
In this study, we focus on the informativeness of the rating system as a normative criterion
for two reasons. First is from the viewpoint of consumer protection: as the rating system
gets more informative about the quality of a product, the price is likely to be close to the
underlying quality. Thus, it becomes less likely that consumers would face huge regret from
the purchase of the product. Second is from the viewpoint of the platform: the informative-
ness of the rating is crucial to attracting consumers in the long run. If consumers find it
uninformative, they, as well as the sellers, can move to other platforms, given less consumers
in the market. Thus, the informativeness of the rating would be the first priority when the
platform controls it.
Since rational customers can form an unbiased estimate from any current rating, Mt =
E [θt|Yt], the informativeness of the rating is defined by the variance of the customer’s es-
timate of quality. Owing to the normality assumption, this is rewritten as V ar (θt|Yt) =
V ar (θt) (1− ρ2), where ρ2 is the correlation between θt and Yt. Therefore, we use ρ2 as the
criterion for the informativeness of the rating.
Given an equilibrium strategy, the stochastic differential equations—Eqs. (1) and (5)—give
us ρ2 as a function of the parameters and the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the change
of a parameter directly affects ρ2 and indirectly affects it via a change of the equilibrium
strategy. Fortunately, by representing the equilibrium coefficients α and β as functions of
the equilibrium aggregator L = aβλ, all the direct and indirect effects of the censorship (a)
are expressed as an effect through L. Comparative statics about other parameters, such as
φ and σξ/σθ, can also be examined by the indirect effect through L and the direct effect.
Lemma 3. At the equilibrium, ρ2 is expressed as a function:
ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ, r, bq) =
(φ+ L)
(κ+ φ+ L)
(A (L; φ, κ, r, bq) + 1)2
((A (L; φ, κ, r, bq) + 1)2 + κ(σξ/σθ)2(κ+ φL))
on which a, c, τ have effects only through L.
A (L; φ, κ, r, bq) summarizes all the direct and indirect effects of a on the informativeness
as a function of L.
3.3.1 Filtering/Censoring Reviews
First, we analyze the impact of a filtering/censoring policy, a. Do fake reviews damage the
informativeness of the rating system compared with the case without fake reviews? Does
filtering or censoring the reviews (i.e., decrease in a) increase the rating’s informativeness?
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As a benchmark, we derive informativeness without fake reviews. By construction, we
can do this by letting α = β = δ = 0.13 The same informativeness is also replicated by
setting L = 0 in ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) to make it easier to compare with the informativeness
at the equilibrium.
Lemma 4. ρ2 (0; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) coincides with ρ
2 under the no-fake strategy.
Note that L = 0 does not necessarily mean α = β = δ = 0. For instance, L approaches
0 as a approaches 0; but at the same time, β converges to some negative value. The lemma
says that even under such a situation, informativeness is the same as that without fake
reviews. Lemma 2, which is about the relationship between L and parameters, and Lemma
4 together lead us to the following proposition:
Proposition 5. The informativeness of the rating system in equilibrium converges to that
of the “no-fake” strategy as aτ
c
→ 0.
Thus, even though the equilibrium strategy at the limit of aτ
c
is not necessarily the no-fake
strategy, the informativeness converges to that of the no-fake strategy.
By analyzing the behavior of ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) with respect to L, we can conclude that
the informativeness can be even higher under some parameters where a positive amount of
the fake reviews is expected. In other words, stringent censorship can decrease the informa-
tiveness of the rating system.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium strategy is more informative than no-fake strategy under a
set of parameters such that
1. aτ
c
is sufficiently large, or
2. aτ
c





Fig. 3 shows the behavior of ρ2 with respect to L. The first part of the proposition comes
from the fact that ρ2 converges to 1 as L approaches infinity. Since L is increasing aτ
c
from
zero to infinity, the equilibrium informativeness surpasses that of the no-fake benchmark
at some point as aτ
c
increases. The second part is derived from the behavior of ρ2 around
L = 0. The derivative of ρ2 with respect to L is determined by the relative size of φ2 and
(κ2 + σ2θ/σ
2
ξ ): If φ





, then ρ2 decreases in L; thus, decreases in aτ
c
. 14
13Actually, δ does not enter in the formula for the informativeness, so δ = 0 does not matter in terms of
the informativeness.
14Note that E [Ft] is increasing in L and positive for large L (by Proposition 1). Thus, the high informa-
tiveness is not due to negative fake reviews, but associated with the positive amount of fake reviews.
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Figure 3: Change of the informativeness in the aggregator L
The graph indicates that the informativeness is (i) increasing in L if φ and r are relatively
low, (ii) increasing in L around zero, then decreasing, and then increasing if φ is relatively
low but r is relatively high, and (iii) decreasing in L around zero and then increasing in L if
φ is relatively high. It also indicates the rating becomes more informative than the no-fake
benchmark as L gets large.
The intuition of this proposition consists of two parts: (i) As mentioned in Subsection
3.2.1, the sensitivity of fake reviews to θt decreases as the strategic effect L decreases. Thus,
the strict censorship policy, which reduces the equilibrium aggregator L, decreases the sig-
naling effect of the fake reviews. (ii) Meanwhile, L > 0 increases the effective transition
speed of reputation to φ+ L. It can be good or bad in terms of informativeness, depending




ξ ≡ φ0 is
the informativeness-maximizing φ, given no fake reviews. Therefore, if φ is smaller than φ0,
the faster transition improves informativeness. It turns out that the first effect dominates in
the case of a large L and the second effect dominates in the case of L close to zero.
3.3.2 Weights on New/Previous Reviews
Next, we analyze the optimal weights of the new and old reviews. Again, the informativeness
without fake reviews is expressed by ρ2 (0; φ, κ, σξ, σθ). Therefore, the optimal weight at
this benchmark is simply characterized by ∂
∂φ
ρ2 (0; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) = 0. Let φ
0 be the solu-
tion to this equation. Meanwhile, at equilibrium, φ changes the equilibrium aggregator L.





ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) +
∂
∂L
ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ)
dL
dφ





< 0 at φ = φ0. Furthermore, if r is sufficiently small, then ρ2 (L (φ∗) ; φ∗, κ, σξ, σθ) >
15φ corresponding to disaggregated information, φd, is an alternative benchmark as in Bonatti and Cis-
ternas (2019). In this model, we obtain a mixed result for the comparison of φ∗ and φd. See the appendix
for more details.
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Figure 4: Change of the informativeness in φ
The left panel shows change of the informativeness in φ when r is relatively low, while the
right panel shows that of a relatively high r. The informativeness is maximized at a lower φ
under the equilibrium than the maximizer under the no-fake benchmark.
ρ2 (0; φ0, κ, σξ, σθ).
The first part of the proposition states that the platform should reduce the speed of
transition φ, given the existence the fake reviews. Intuitively, this is explained as follows. At
equilibrium, the transition of the rating score Yt is φ+L where L is non-negative. Therefore,
to cancel the strategic impact on the transition speed, the platform should decrease φ,
compared with the no-fake benchmark φ0. Again, the transition speed is interpreted as
the relative weight of the new information. At the equilibrium, the number of fake reviews
decreases in the current rating; thus, the fake reviews cancel the past performance. In other
words, the new information is effectively weighted more than the platform intends. Thus,
the platform can increase the informativeness by adjusting it downward.
The second part of the proposition is even more striking. If the seller is sufficiently
concerned about the future, the platform can achieve higher informativeness than the no-
fake review benchmark by adjusting the speed of updating the rating. The implication is
similar to Proposition 5, but is slightly different from it. The right panel of Fig. 3 illustrates
that informativeness at equilibrium is greater than that without fake reviews under some
parameters (e.g., φ = 0.9), as shown in Proposition 5, but it can still be lower than the
maximum informativeness without fake reviews (maximized around φ = 1.6). The second
part of Proposition 6 states that even when we compare the maximum informativeness of
the rating with and without fake reviews, the one with fake reviews will be higher if the
seller cares enough about the future as shown in the left panel of Fig. 3.
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3.3.3 The Precision of Genuine Reviews
Lastly, we examine the impact of the precision of organic feedback,
σξ
σθ




and decreasing a have similar effects on the equilibrium strategy.
However, they differ in terms of the impact on informativeness. This is because a affects








rating score, by definition, is less informative about quality. The indirect effect consists of
two parts, like the comparative statics over a: (i) Higher
σξ
σθ
implies a smaller strategic effect
L, which implies less signaling effect. (ii) L > 0 effectively increases the rating transition
to φ+ L. The following proposition shows that the direct effect and the first indirect effect
dominate the second indirect effect for any parameter.




Thus, the precise organic feedback increases informativeness even though it comes with
more fake reviews.
4 Rating Design for Naive Consumers
The model with rational consumers is a standard starting point for any economic model, but
in the context of customer reviews, it is natural to consider the impact on naive consumers
who do not expect any fake reviews. The regulator often tries to protect customers from fake
reviews, with the assumption that the fake reviews can fool or at least confuse consumers.
In this section, we assume that some consumers do not expect any fake reviews on the
platform. They are modeled by assuming that the reputation (and the price) is characterized
as M̃t = µ+λ̃ [Yt − ν̃] where λ̃ and ν̃ are characterized by the stochastic differential equations
Eqs. (1) and (5), where α = β = δ = a = 0. Meanwhile, the long-lived seller faces the same
problem as in the previous chapter, except for the definition pt.
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4.1 Model / Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, the price is assumed to be a convex combination of a rational reputation M
and a naive reputation M̃ .
16
Note to be added: Similarity to Milgrom and Roberts (1986b) RAND “Relying on the Information of
Interested Parties”]
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p = ηM + (1− η) M̃















One interpretation is that each consumer can be partially rational. Their expectation about
the quality of the product is somewhere in between the totally sophisticated expectation and
the totally naive expectation. The rationality of each consumer is captured by η.
Another interpretation is that η is the ratio of rational consumers among all consumers.
Then, the market price is set somewhere in between the rational expectation and the naive
expectation. When the ratio of rational consumers increases, it converges to the rational
expectation. The linear specification captures such a relationship in a simple manner. Fur-
thermore, it can be rationalized as an equilibrium price given a specific utility function of
buyers. Suppose that there are n consumers in the market and η ·n of them are rational and
the other (1− η) · n are naive. Consumer i ∈ [0, n] feels ut,i = θt + ǫt,i − pt if the consumer
buys the product, and 0 otherwise, where ǫt,i is identically and independently distributed.
Rational and naive consumers differ only in terms of how they form their expectation based
on the same observation of the rating Yt. Conditional on Yt, a rational consumer purchases
the product if and only if Mt + ǫi − p ≥ 0, while a naive consumer purchases it if and only
if M̃t + ǫi − p ≥ 0. Therefore, the total demand function is expressed as






where F (p) is the c.d.f. of the random variable ǫi. By letting n = 2q and assuming that ǫi
is distributed uniformly and symmetrically around zero. We obtain p = ηM + (1− η) M̃ to
clear the market.
In this section, we consider a linear strategy Ft = α̂θt + β̂Yt + γ̂ and the HJB equation
with state variables θ and Y because Y keeps track of both M and M̃ in a simple manner:
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rV (θ, Y ) = sup
F∈R
(1− τ) p · q − τp · F − c
2
F 2
− κ (θ − µ)Vθ









The following theorem states that, even with credulous consumers, we have the existence
and uniqueness given the same condition as the baseline model.
Theorem 2. For any η ∈ [0, 1], a stationary linear Markov equilibrium always exists. For






, λ > 0 and L > 0 hold. Furthermore, if h′ (L) < 0
holds, then such an equilibrium is unique and the equilibrium coefficients α, β, and δ are
differentiable in the parameters.
h′ (L) < 0 holds for any L > 0 if 6κφ+ 4r2 + 2κr + 17rφ+ 19φ2 > κ2.
In addition, surprisingly, the existence of naive consumers reduces the seller’s strategic
behavior.
Proposition 9. The equilibrium with naive consumers (η ∈ [0, 1)) generates a smaller |α|,
a larger |β|,and a smaller E [Ft] compared with the equilibrium without naive consumers
(η = 1).
This is because rational consumers are more sensitive to the change in ratings compared
with naive consumers. Rational consumers know that the rating is boosted, but they also
know that the rating is boosted more by a firm with a high quality product. Therefore,
rational consumers attribute the boosted rating to high quality, and set a high price for such
a boosted rating. Meanwhile, naive consumers are unaware of such a strategic correlation
between quality and a rating. Therefore, with naive consumers, the price is less responsive
to the boost of the ratings; thus, the seller faces a smaller marginal benefit of fake reviews,
which leads fewer fake reviews in expectation.
Readers might wonder why the seller does not become more exploitative of naive con-
sumers. This is simply because the fake review strategy against rational consumers generates
more fake reviews for different reasons than exploiting consumers. If only a small number
of naive consumers exist and observe the ratings, naive consumers would form even more
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biased estimates because the seller makes more fake reviews to send a good signal to rational
consumers.
4.2 Optimal Rating System for Naive Consumers
Criteria: Bias in the Reputation. In this section, we evaluate the impact of fake reviews
on naive consumers. To do so, we introduce a bias in the naive consumer’s expectation caused







µ− θt + λ̃ [Yt − ν̃]
]
= λ̃ [ν − ν̃]
where λ̃ is the sensitivity of the reputation to the rating, and ν and ν̃ are the actual mean of
the rating and the estimate of the mean of the rating by the naive consumers, respectively.
The decomposition of the bias, as shown above, is intuitive: the positive bias is due to the
boosted reputation. Because naive consumers do not expect any fake reviews, they interpret
a high rating ( Yt > ν̃) as a result of high quality, even though it is actually the average level
of the rating at equilibrium (Yt = ν > ν̃).
Therefore, as long as the seller makes a positive amount of fake reviews (in expectation)
to boost the rating, naive consumers are positively biased. This intuition is verified in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. Bias ≥ 0 if and only if E [Ft] ≥ 0.
4.2.1 Filtering/Censoring Reviews
In the following section, for the sake of tractability, I focus on the case of η = 0, where only
naive consumers exist in the market. Numerical exercises for η ∈ (0, 1) can be found in the
Appendix.
First, we examine the impact of a filtering policy, for which regulators are arguably con-
cerned the most. The following proposition provides a theoretical background of a stringent
policy that procect the naive customers. Note that even though the statement seems pretty
intuitive, it is not trivial because the model predicts a non-monotonouse relationship between
censorship and bias in general. Fortunately, in a realistic range of parameters, where naive
consumers suffer from a positive bias in their reputation, stringent censorship will reduce
such a bias.
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Figure 5: Impact of censorship intensity and the weights of reviews on naive consumer’s bias.
Proposition 10. Suppose Bias ≥ 0; then, Bias increases in a.
Combined with Lemma 5, the condition for a stringent policy to work for naive consumers
is translated as the condition of a measure observable by the platform.
Corollary 1. Stringent censorship reduces the bias of naive consumers whenever the expected
amount of fake reviews is positive.
Thus, as long as a positive number of fake reviews are observed, the stringent policy is
beneficial for naive consumers, even though it can reduce informativeness of rating for the
rational consumers.
4.2.2 Weights on New/Previous Reviews
As shown in Fig. 5, the bias tends to be hump-shaped in φ. This is intuitive because
fake reviews would be effective only when the rating is believed to be informative by the
consumers so that the consumers react to the rating. Since the informativeness is hump
shaped in φ, so is the bias caused by the fake reviews. This emphasizes that the trade-off
between bias and informativeness can be an inherent feature of fake reviews.
Some readers might want an integrated criteria for bias and the informativeness. The
mean squared error (MSE) is a natural candidate. It does not provide a clear-cut prediction,
but a simulation of MSE is provided in the Appendix.
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5 Conclusions
In this study, the effects of fake reviews on rational and credulous consumers are analyzed.
The key assumption is that a high reputation results in a high cost of fake reviews. This
is rationalized by the high reimbursement to reviewers or high demand for the product and
the substantial, authentic feedback crowding-out the fake reviews.
At equilibrium, the amount of fake reviews increases (decreases) as product quality (firm
reputation) increases (improves), which implies difficulties in the empirical analysis of sig-
naling promotion. Stringent censorship reduces the expected amount of fake reviews, while
decreasing the signaling effect and increasing the effective transition speed of the rating.
This leads to a normative result wherein the rating under a less strict filtering policy can
be more informative than the rating under a strict policy or the rating with no fake reviews.
In terms of the weights of new and old information in a rating system where fake reviews exist,
the platform should reduce the weight of new information to maximize the informativeness
of the rating, compared with a rating system that does not have fake reviews. Since fake
reviews effectively attenuate the impact of old information and increase the relative weight
of the new information, the platform should make the necessary adjustments.
The existence of credulous consumers decreases the expected amount of fake reviews
since they are less responsive to the rating without being aware of the positive relationship
between fake reviews and the quality. Moreover, they are vulnerable to fake reviews and pay
more than the true quality in expectation. The model predicts that as long as a positive
amount of the fake reviews is observed, the regulator or the platform can reduce such biased
behaviors by enhancing censorship.
The results emphasize that regulators or platforms would face a trade-off between the
degree of informativeness and the bias caused by fake reviews. As long as the rating is
considered informative, the incentive to make fake reviews arises.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. By Mt = µ+ λ [Yt − ν] ⇔ λYt = Mt − µ+ λν, and the linear strategy
Ft = αθt + βMt + δµ, the increment of Mt is written as
dMt = d (λYt)
= (−φ+ aλβ)Mtdt
+ (aλα + bqλ) θtdt




Now, we look for a quadratic value function
V = v0 + v1θ + v2M + v3θ
2 + v4M
2 + v5θM (11)
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satisfying the HJB equation:
rV (θ, M) = sup
F∈R
(1− τ)M · q − τM · F − c
2
F 2
− κ (θ − µ)Vθ
+
{
aλF + bqλθ − φ
[











By the first-order condition,
0 = −τM − cF + aλVM





































By solving them for vk’s,
c
aλ













By the Envelop condition w.r.t. M ,17
rVM = (1− τ) q − τF
− κ (θ − µ)VθM
− φVM
+ {aλF + bqλθ − φ [M − µ+ λν]}VMM
By inserting the derivatives of eq.(11) and equating the coefficients of θ, M , and constants
on LHS and RHS,
(r + φ) v5 = −τα− κv5 + {aλα + bqλ} 2v4
2 (r + φ) v4 = −τβ + {aλβ − φ} 2v4
(r + φ) v2 = (1− τ) q − τδθ̄ + κµv5 + {aλδµ+ φµ− φλν} 2v4
Then, inserting eq.(12) to eq (14),
(r + φ+ κ)
c
aλ



























= (1− τ) q − τδµ+ κµ c
aλ

















, we can characterize
α, β, δ, λ. In the following, I do so by using an aggregator L = −aβλ so that the stationarity
condition is easier to verify. First, by replacing λ to − L
aβ
in the above four equations,
0 = −bq(βc+ τ)
a





























σ2θ(L+ φ)(aα + bq)
σ2θ(aα + bq)
2 + κbqσ2ξ (κ+ L+ φ)
(21)
17The envelop condition w.r.t. θ gives conditions characterizing v1 and v3, and one characterizing v5,
which coincides with the condition from the envelop condition w.r.t. M .
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≡ B (L). By inserting this into (18) and




≡ A (L). By plugging β = B (L) and α = A (L)




σ2θ(L+ φ)(aA (L) + bq)
σ2θ(aA (L) + bq)
2 + κbqσ2ξ (κ+ L+ φ)
Rearranging it , we get
1 =
σ2θ(L+ φ)(aA (L) + bq)
σ2θ(aA (L) + bq)




To evaluate h (L), the sign of L is useful to characterize.
Lemma 6. β < 0 and L > 0 under the linear stationary Gaussian equilibrium.











r + φ+ φ+ L
)
< 0













> 0. Now, we can
conclude −aβλ ≡ L > 0.
Now, it is shown that limL→0 h (L) = ∞ and limL→∞ h (L) = 0. Then, combined with
the continuity of h (L), there exist some L such that h (L) = 1. The uniqueness is proved by
checking whether h′ (L) < 0 holds. It is shown that
h′ (L) =− h1 (L)
{
h2 (L) + L
4
(
−κ2 + 6κφ+ 4r2 + 2κr + 17rφ+ 19φ2
)}
where h1 (L) , h2 (L) > 0 for all L > 0. Thus, 6κφ+4r
2+2κr+17rφ+19φ2 > κ2 is sufficient
for h′ (L) < 0
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where h3 = (L + φ)(r + 2φ)
2(κ + L + r + φ) (L2 + L(r + 2φ) + (r + 2φ)(κ+ r + φ)),
h4 = bq (L
2 + L(r + 2φ) + (r + 2φ)(κ+ r + φ))
2
, h5 = κ(r+2φ)
2(κ+L+φ)(κ+L+ r+φ)2.
Note that h3, h4, h5 are positive and independent of a and σξ/σθ. Thus, h is increasing
in aτ
c
and decreasing in σξ/σθ. Since h
′ (L) < 0 is shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the
implicit function theorem tells that L is increasing in a and decreasing in σξ/σθ. Furthermore,
h (L) → ∞ if L is bounded above and aτ
c
→ ∞. Thus, to satisfy the equilibrium condition:
1 = h (L), L goes infinite as aτ
c
goes infinite. Similarly, h (L) → 0 if L is bounded away
from zero and aτ
c
→ 0. Thus, L goes infinite as aτ
c
goes infinite to satisfy the equilibrium
condition.
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2. Since E [Mt] = E [E [θt|Yt]] = µ, we have E [Ft] = E [αθt + βMt + δµ] =
(α + β + δ)µ. By expressing α, β, δ as a function of the equilibrium aggregator L, it is writ-
ten as E [Ft] =
cLq(1−τ)(L+r+2φ)−µτ2(r2+3rφ+2φ2)
cτ(L2+L(r+2φ)+r2+3rφ+2φ2)















. By Lemma 2, we can conclude E [Ft]




Since E [Ft] > 0 for sufficiently large L and L → ∞ as a → ∞, E [Ft] > 0 holds for
sufficiently large a.











. Furthermore, it is shown that ∂α
∂L
> 0 and ∂β
∂L
> 0. Then, Lemma 2 con-
cludes the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3 and 4. An arbitrary strategy α, β, δ satisfying φ − aβλ (not necessarily
the equilibrium strategy) generates a stationary distribution. Using the vairance-covariance
matrix of the stationary distribution, the informativeness is written as
ρ2 =
(φ− aβλ)(aα + bq)2
(κ+ φ− aβλ)
(
(aα + bq)2 + κbq (σξ/σθ)
2 (κ+ φ− aβλ)
)
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(bq)2 + κbq (σξ/σθ)
2 (κ+ φ)
)
.On the other hand, at the equilibrium, −aβλ can be replaced to L, and aα is written as a
function in L: aα = bq L
2
(r+2φ)(r+φ+κ+L)
such that aα = 0 when L = 0. Note that a does not
appear in the RHS, so the direct and indirect effects of a on a ·α are all captured by L. Now
the equilibrium informativeness is written as:
ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) =
(φ+ L)(aα + bq)2
(κ+ φ+ L)
(
(aα + bq)2 + κbq (σξ/σθ)
2 (κ+ φ+ L)
) .







) coincides with the informativeness
without fake reviews. This concludes Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. The first part is proved by the limit as L → ∞:
lim
L→∞






(aα + bq)2 + κbq (σξ/σθ)
2 (κ+ φ+ L)
)
=1
The second part comes from the derivative of ρ2 with respect to L around zero.
Proof of Proposition 6. The optimal φ without fake reviews is characterized by ∂
∂φ
ρ2 (0; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) =
0, which yields φ0 =
√
bq (σθ/σξ)
2 + κ2 as the optimal level. On the other hand, the effect






ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) +
∂
∂L






ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ)−
∂
∂L











The second part is proved by two inequalities: ρ2 (0; φ0, κ, σξ, σθ) < ρ
2 (L (φ0) ; φ0, κ, σξ, σθ) ≤
ρ2 (L (φ∗) ; φ∗, κ, σξ, σθ). The first inequality is proved as follows. For any L > 0,
ρ2
(




0; φ0, κ, σξ, σθ
)
=r · g1 + g2
where g1 is polynomial in r and L and g2 > 0 is polynomial in L and does not depend on r.
Since L → C for some C > 0 as r → 0, r · g1 + g2 converges to a positive number. Thus, for
sufficiently small r, the first inequality holds. The second inequality holds by definition.





ρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) − ∂∂Lρ2 (L; φ, κ, σξ, σθ) ∂h∂(σξ/σθ)/
∂h
∂L




Proof of Theorem 2. Now, we look for a quadratic value function
V = v0 + v1θ + v2Y + v3θ
2 + v4Y
2 + v5θY (22)
satisfying the HJB equation:
rV (θ, Y ) = sup
F∈R
(1− τ) p · q − τp · F − c
2
F 2
− κ (θ − µ)Vθ









s.t. p = µ−
(




ηλν + (1− η) λ̃ν̃
)
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ηλν + (1− η) λ̃ν̃
)
, and the envelop condition gives
0 = λ̂ατ − 2aαv4 − 2bqv4 + rv5 + κv5 + v5φ (26)
0 = −2aβv4 + βλ̂τ + 2rv4 + 4v4φ (27)
0 = −2aδµv4 + δµλ̂τ + λ̂qτ − λ̂q + rv2 − κµv5 + v2φ (28)
By inserting eq.(24) into (27) and solving it for λ̂ and by letting L = aβ, we obtain
λ̂ =
cL(L+ r + 2φ)
aτ(r + 2φ)
≡ λ̂ (L)
On the other hand, the stochastic differential equation for (θ, Y ) gives
λ =
bqσ2θ(L+ φ) (A (L) + 1)
σ2θ (bqA (L) + bq)










ηλ+ (1− η) λ̃
)
⇒ 1 = ηλ (0) + (1− η)λ (L)
λ̂ (L)
≡ h (L; η)
Note that limL→0 h (L; η) = ∞ and limL→∞ h (L; η) = 0. Then, hL (L; η) < 0 holds for any
η ∈ [0, 1] as long as hL (L; 1) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since λ (0) ≤ λ (L) for any L ≥ 0, we have h (L; η) ≤ h (L; 1) for
any η ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the equilibrium L will be smaller given η < 1 than the equilibrium L
given η = 1.
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The expected amount of the fake reviews is
E [Ft] = αµ+ βν + δµ
By plugging the equilibrium conditions and taking derivative with respect to L, we can show
∂
∂L
E [Ft] ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. At the equilibrium, ∂bias
∂L
≥ 0 always holds and ∂bias
∂a
≥ 0 holds if
bias ≥ 0.
B An interpretation of the pricing rule
this pricing rule as a result of competition among heterogeneous consumers, to which we
can easily introduce a mixture of rational and naive consumers in the next section. Suppose
that consumer i ∈ [0, n] feels ut,i = θt + ǫt,i − pt if the consumer buy the product, and 0
otherwise, where ǫt,i is identically and independently distributed. Then, given the rating
shown on the platform, Yt, the consumer will choose to purchase the product if and only if
E [θt|Yt] + ǫt,i − pt ≥ 0. Therefore, the demand function is expressed as n · (1− F (pt −Mt))
where F (·) is a c.d.f. of the random variable ǫt,i. By letting n = 2q and assuming that ǫt,i
is distributed symmetrically around zero. We obtain pt = Mt as the market clearing price.
C An Alternative Model with Changing q
The same results with the base line model can be generated with a slightly different specifi-
cation of the model with the quantity level dependent on the reputation level.
Now, suppose that the seller sells qt units of the product at a fixed price of p, and makes
Ft units of fake reviews. The quality of the product is denoted as θt. A sufficiently large
mass of consumers forms a belief on the quality E [θt|Yt] ≡ Mt and the demand function
based on that. Since the price is fixed, high reputation results in large quantity: qt = Mt.








The difference from the main model is that the quantity varies over time and the coefficient
of dZξt is now defined as bqtσξ instead of
√
bqtσξ. In this specification, we can analyze the
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effect of the organic reviews crowding out the fake reviews, but not the effect of the large
transaction generating intrinsically more precise information by the large sample.
The seller’s instantaneous payoff is defined as:







where τ is transaction fees imposed by the platform. The specification of the quadratic cost
is now different from the base line model: the seller needs to pay a large cost if the seller
tries to increase the share of the fake reviews among the all the reviews. The revenue and
the reimbursement cost is still the same as the baseline model.
















By changing the choice variable of the seller from Ft to
Ft
Mt
, which is the combination of the
original variable and a constant at time t, we can write the instantaneous profit isomorphic
to one in the baseline model. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the platform use an









The model is then isomorphic to the baseline model, so generates the same results as
those from the baseline model.
D Simulation Results
D.1 Mixture of the Rational and Naive Consumers
In the main part, the correlation of the rating with the underlying true quality for rational
consumers, and the bias for the naive consumers are examined. There is a trade-off of the
correlation and the bias. Then, natural questions are (i) how to integrate such indices into
one objective function, and (ii) how it changes as the market’s rationality changes from
totally naive to totally rational. In this section, we suggest a mean squared error of the
price since the price is considered as the whole market’s prediction about the underlying
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quality. The minimization of the mean squared errors minimizes the customers’ ex post
regret on average, so increases the value-added of the platform, and attracts the customers
in long-run.
D.1.1 Mean Squared Error








η {µ+ λ [Yt − ν]}+ (1− η)
{




= V ar (Yt)
{(








+ (1− η)2 Bias2 + V ar (θt)
Note that, when η = 1, minimization of MSE is reduced to maximization of the correlation
of the rating Yt and θt:
MSEp = −λ2V ar (Yt) + V ar (θt)
= V ar (θt)
{










For different levels of η, we calculate the correlation of Y and θ as a criteria for the rational
consumers, the bias as a criteria for naive consumers, and the mean squared error as a
criteria for the whole market. See fig.5 for the simulation results. The correlation of the
rating with the underlying quality show the similar pattern regardless of the level of η, while
it is scaled up as the rationality increases. So does the bias the naive consumers faces. This
is consistent with Proposition 9. As the market becomes more rational, the consumers takes
the signaling effect of the seller’s fake reviews (α > 0), so the market becomes more sensitive
to the rating. Then, the seller will have more incentive to make fake reviews, resulting
in more bias for naive consumers. At the same time, the signaling effect (α > 0) is also
enhanced by this increased manipulation by the seller. Therefore, the rating becomes more
informative for rational consumers. Roughly speaking, the mean squared error integrates
the correlation and the bias into one. As the ratio of the rational consumers increases, the
correlation becomes more important. As the ratio of the naive consumers increases, the bias
comes more important. Fig. 5 exhibits this. For η = 0, 0.3333, 0.6666, the MSE shows the
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similar pattern as the bias, while the MSE shows the similar pattern as the correlation for
η = 0.9999. Given other parameters used in the simulation, the bias is the dominant force
in MSE for most of η. This results depends on the parameter setting, so is ultimately an
empirical question, but suggests that decreasing the bias is more important than increasing
the informativeness for rational consumers.
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Figure 6: Correlation, bias, and mean squared errors
From top to the bottom, the rationality of the market is increased from 0, 0.3333, 0.6666, to 0.9999. The
left panels are contours of the correlation of the rating Yt with θt based on rational expectations taking the
seller’s strategy into account. The middle panels show biases the naive consumers faces. The right panels
show the mean squared errors of the market price as a whole market’s prediction of the underlying quality.
Red dashed lines border sets of parameters which predict realistic positive bias (positive number of positive
fake reviews) at the equilibrium. Areas above red lines corresponds to the positive number of positive fake
reviews.
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